

TOP SECRET

25X1

29 December 1961

25X1

Copy No. C 92

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100310001-9

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100310001-9

25X1

29 December 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1

5. Vietnam: Hanoi may be preparing for open and increased support of Viet Cong guerrillas. (*Page iv*)

25X1

7. South Korea - Japan: Tokyo appears reluctant to proceed with crucial phase of negotiations to normalize relations. (*Page v*)
8. Conclusions of Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin Situation. (*Page v*)

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100310001-9



Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100310001-9

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

29 December 1961

DAILY BRIEF

25X1



Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

[REDACTED]

Vietnam: North Vietnam may be setting the stage for more open and extensive support for the Viet Cong. On 22 December, Hanoi broadcast a statement by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam saying that, "if need be," the Front would call for "comprehensive assistance including material aid from friendly countries." The Front is the political element of the Communist subversive effort in South Vietnam. Hanoi has thus far been careful to keep its material support of the Viet Cong clandestine.

25X6

Communist China may be planning some military logistic assistance to North Vietnam; Peiping's minister of defense, Marshal Lin Piao, recently pledged "full support" for the North Vietnamese and "joint efforts" to defend "the security of our respective countries."

25X1

25X1

25X1

29 Dec 61

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

South Korea - Japan: Tokyo is showing signs of vacillation as negotiations to normalize relations with South Korea approach a crucial stage, according to Ambassador Reischauer. He believes that Prime Minister Ikeda's party colleagues are withholding their support, arguing that Japan's economic difficulties make a costly settlement of South Korea's economic claims against Japan politically unpalatable at this time. The Koreans have presented a demand for \$1.2 billion. They have, however, implied a willingness to consider economic assistance in the form of grants to offset part of their demands, and requested a meeting on the "political level" to conclude a settlement.

[REDACTED]

25X1

CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 13 through 27 December 1961:

1. There has been no major change in the general Soviet political position on Berlin during the past two weeks. While Moscow represented the NATO approval of further diplomatic contacts on Berlin as a step forward, this line has been accompanied by a generally negative assessment of Western willingness to negotiate on a "realistic" basis. Within this context of maintaining pressure on the West, [REDACTED] the USSR expects formal East-West negotiations on Berlin by February and that if this fails to occur

25X1

25X1

29 Dec 61

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

25X1

a bloc peace conference is planned for March to sign a treaty with East Germany.

2. An effort to strengthen Moscow's hand in the negotiations and to remove the question of East Berlin from the area of negotiations probably were the primary motives in Soviet approval of the East German refusal to permit the US political adviser in Berlin or General Watson's civilian aides to enter East Berlin without displaying identification. Since the Soviet authorities were obviously aware that the US officials were proceeding to appointments with their Soviet counterparts, these moves were a deliberate test of Western reaction to a further encroachment on the right of official Allied access.

3. East German security precautions in and around West Berlin continue at a high level. Construction of approximately one hundred watch towers along the zonal and to a lesser extent the sector border has been rushed in an apparent effort to improve East German and Soviet capability of observing developments within the city. Police and border guard detachments along the Berlin sector border were approximately doubled over the Christmas weekend--a security measure that will probably obtain through the holiday period. The East Germans have continued to subject Allied duty trains en route to and from West Berlin to harassing delays. Propaganda attacks on use of the Berlin autobahn by US Army convoys, however, have diminished. Nevertheless, the regime has reserved the right to claim compensation for damages caused by military traffic and may use this excuse to increase the tolls imposed on West German traffic for use of the autobahn.

4. These steps have been accompanied by a heavy propaganda campaign against West Berlin morale, including the planting of hints that "something" would happen in the city during the holiday period. There are signs of increasing restiveness among the West Berlin population and growing concern in

29 Dec 61

DAILY BRIEF

vi

25X1

the business community. People are particularly irate that families separated by the sector border cannot get together during the holidays. The possibility can not be ruled out that individual West Berliners or groups may take action against the wall. The West Berlin Senat is understandably reluctant to use West Berlin police to counter such action but the police reportedly are keeping a careful watch over such groups, particularly students. In this psychological atmosphere, any reasonably credible rumor of possible Western compromise or of further Western withdrawals would find fertile ground.

5. The net effect of developments in the Communist air defenses of East Germany throughout 1961 has been a substantial improvement--both quantitatively and qualitatively--in the ability of the USSR and East Germany to support militarily decisions concerning Berlin. [REDACTED]

25X1

29 Dec 61

DAILY BRIEF

vii

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Disorders May Erupt in Urundi

The threat of intertribal violence is growing in Urundi as competing tribal groups turn into rival political parties. Tutsi Prime Minister Muhirwa, who assumed power following the assassination of Prince Rwagasore last October, has alienated many Hutu supporters by making his regime increasingly representative only of Tutsi interests. Meanwhile, Mushatsi-Kareba, whose French wife has Communist sympathies, is organizing the Hutu majority of the population into an effective political force.

Any early outbreak of violence would come at a particularly unfortunate time. There is a deteriorating local security situation--Belgian Army troops are being reduced from more than 2,000 men to some 400 even though a reliable African gendarmerie is lacking--while confusion and low morale are widespread in the local Belgian administration. Local Belgians reportedly have not been willing to work closely with leaders of Urundi's governing party, which campaigned last September on an anti-Belgian platform and defeated the Belgian-sponsored party. Furthermore, they are concerned that Brussels will order a quick reduction in the Belgian administrative force in view of the imminent de facto ending of the trusteeship.

During recent negotiations in Brussels with representatives of both Ruanda and Urundi, Belgium worked out arrangements to give both territories local autonomy early in the new year. In so doing, Brussels also hopes to send new technical personnel to replace those Belgian administrators "who reflect a colonialist mentality."

Under the plan negotiated with representatives of both Ruanda and Urundi, the central trusteeship administration is being broken into separate administrations for Ruanda and Urundi. Belgian officials would retain only those powers which under the trust agreement Brussels cannot give up, such as foreign affairs, defense,

25X1

and internal security, as well as overall financial policy. Brussels hopes by February to place the remaining Belgian powers under the direction of a special representative of the Foreign Ministry. Meanwhile, Belgium plans to provide economic and technical assistance needed by both areas. Both Ruanda and Urundi have expressed a desire for eventual political separation, but have shown a willingness to consider economic and technical cooperation.

The affairs of the trust territory are scheduled for consideration in the United Nations in mid-January. The UN commission which investigated the September elections and disorders following them has prepared a report which is not generally critical of Belgium. However, in view of the failure of Afro-Asian members of the commission to support Chairman Dorsinville's personal recommendation to accept the results of the elections in Ruanda, there may be criticism of Belgium's role and a demand for new elections in Ruanda, where there was considerable violence. As a result of tribal fighting in Ruanda there are close to 200,000 Tutsi tribal refugees in surrounding areas.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100310001-9

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100310001-9